Fukuyama on Conservatism

Francis Fukuyama gets American conservatism right in yesterday's Wall St. Journal.

Not only is America "exceptional" among advanced democracies, but American conservatism is exceptional as well. American conservatism is not a defense of the status quo based on hierarchy, tradition, and a pessimistic view of human nature; rather it is closer to classical liberalism as Jake told us recently. Classical liberals favor free markets, individual initiative, and a democratic polity based on individual, not collective, rights.

In foreign affairs, American conservatism translates into more "idealism" than is usually associated with conservatism. Although there have always been "realist" foreign policy elements of American conservatism, focussed on protecting national security in very narrow terms and best exemplified by Henry Kissinger, the current response of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 reflects an idealism also typically present in American conservatism.

The phrase "regime change" represents an ambitious, idealistic agenda for re-ordering the politics of the Middle East. The administration hopes that removing Saddam Hussein from power will have profound effects on the entire region, making the Israeli-Palestininian problem more tractable, putting pressure on other authroritarian regimes in the region, and preparing the way for more democratic trends generally.

This idealistic project has many problems. Traditionally conservative reservations regarding it include America's failure to maintain such ambitious projects over time, the imperialism of the project which conflicts with democratic principles perhaps rendering friendly authoritarians more useful to us in the short run, and the lack of understanding on the part of the American people (to date) of this ambitious project.

But it may also be more unrealistic to expect the radicalism that characterized America's founding to wither away completely and to expect the world's only remaining superpower to step off of the global stage. That original radicalism is expressed today in America's promotion of the global economy and muscular foreign policy. In a brilliant rhetorical ploy (though there's substance to it also), Fukuyama concludes by calling Pat Buchanan and the Cato Institute "unrealistic" for assuming that the world's sole superpower can somehow disengage from global power politcs. Fukuyama calls for a more realistic foreign policy which can maintain the conservative principle of prudence.

There is no distinction between neo-con and paleo-con for Fukuyama. A certain idealism (or prudent engagement) in foreign affairs is simply part of American conservatism.